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ABSTRACT
Minimum Wage Regulation (MWR) can raise wage rate, but its
relation with labor income share is in controversy. We explore the
influence of raising wage rate on labor income share and over-
work in China. Panel data regressions are taken mainly based on
China’s Industrial Enterprise Database and the International Labor
Organization Database. Our findings show that raising wage rate
can increase labor income share without leading to overwork.
Factors that may significantly increase overwork are a higher pro-
portion of male workers, a larger income gap and a lower per-
capita income. We point out that the neoclassical explanation for
labor income share is not persuasive. We support policies of rais-
ing wage rate and believe MWR is an effective measure to
increase labor income share.
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1. Introduction
There has been a worldwide decline in labor income share since the 1980s (Blanchard
et al., 1997; Hofman, 2001; Li et al., 2009). As the second-largest economy and the
most successful developing country, China has a seriously low labor income share, only
55% of the U.S., 68% of Japan and even 10% less than that of emerging countries
(Zhang & Zhang, 2011). Labor income share in China has experienced a 12-year
decline, from 51% in 1995 to 40% in 2007, and then gradually increases and exceeds
50% again in 2014 (Bai & Yang, 2019). Relatively large and high-quality domestic
demand will help developing countries to resist external economic risks, promote eco-
nomic growth and overcome the middle-income trap (Zhang et al., 2011). A seriously
low labor income share will lead to insufficient domestic demand and may lead China,
or other developing countries learning from China’s experience, into the middle-
income trap. From the huge response of ‘Capital in the Twenty-first Century’ (Piketty,
2014), we can see that the issue of income distribution is currently a global concern.
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The existing literature generally believes that MWR can raise wage rate (Sen
et al., 2011). But it is controversial whether MWR is effective to increase labor
income share. Neoclassical economics does not believe that raising wage rate can
increase labor income share because its positive effect will be offset by the decline
of employment. The implementation of MWR in China has always been accompa-
nied by opposition from employers. Employers believe wage rate is too high and
call for market-oriented reforms, such as abolishing MWR. Labor protection is
slackened as an option to implement the policy of reducing costs in 2016. Xinhua
Net (2018) indicates that ‘reducing labor costs will be an important measure to sup-
port the real economy.’ People’s Daily Online (2018) also points out that the soar-
ing cost of labor is one of the reasons that companies reduce production capacity
and employees.
Opponents also argue that MWR will trigger overwork. Golden and Altman (2008)
believe that a higher wage rate will prolong employees’ working time under the per-
formance-related wage system. Marx (1844) asserts that employers would ask longer
working hours as compensation after the wage increase brought by MWR.
Unfortunately, overwork is indeed widespread in China. Back in 2013, People’s Daily
Online publishes an article ‘Death-by-Overwork: How to Balance between Making
Money and Keeping Healthy?’ (People’s Daily Online, 2013). Another article also
reports that ‘more than 600,000 employees die from overwork each year in China’
(ifeng, 2016). On April 11th 2019, Jack Ma, the co-founder and executive chairman
of the Alibaba Group tells his employees that the 996 work schedule (from 9 a.m. to
9 p.m., six days per week) is a ‘blessing’ (Baijiahao, 2019). Overwork can threaten
individuals’ health at a micro level (Sparks et al., 1997) and crowd out employment
at a macro level (Geurts & Sonnentag, 2006).
We put forward a scientific hypothesis that raising wage rate will increase labor
income share without leading to overwork. Two empirical analyses are carried out
based on China’s Industrial Enterprise Database and the International Labor
Organization Database. The findings show that raising wage rate can increase labor
income share, but not lead to overwork. Factors that may significantly increase over-
work are a higher proportion of male workers, a larger income gap and a lower per-
capita income.
Our work contributes to the literature in five ways. First, we prove that MWR is a
good measure to increase labor income share: MWR can increase labor income share
without leading to overwork. We investigate the controversy surrounding MWR com-
prehensively and reach a definite conclusion, which is a supplement and an advance-
ment to the existing research. Second, we point out that the neoclassical
interpretation of labor income share is not persuasive and MWR is an effective solu-
tion both in theory and practice. Third, we also find that China’s marketing reforms
may have been excessive rather than insufficient in the labor market. Developed
countries are constantly criticizing China’s lack of marketization, and even think it
has caused the economic imbalance of the world economy (Navarro & Autry, 2011).
Forth, neoclassical economics cannot give effective countermeasures for declining
labor income share. While MWR already has extensive practical experience world-
wide, and steady progress may be achieved by strengthening its implementation. Five,
1730 Q. ZHAN ET AL.
the implementation of MWR will increase China’s imports by boosting domestic
demand and reduce China’s exports by raising wage rate. This may contribute to the
re-balance of the world economy.
The rest of our study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
review. Section 3 presents the model and the data for the influence of raising wage
rate on labor income share. Section 4 reports and discusses the results. Section 5
focuses on the influence of raising wage rate on overwork. In the last section, we con-
clude the study.
2. Literature review
2.1. Theories of the relation between MWR and labor income share
2.1.1. Theoretical bases of neoclassical economics not supporting MWR
Clark (1899) states that wage rate is determined by the marginal product of labor,
which depends on technology. According to his theory, if the mandatory wage is
higher than the equilibrium one decided by the labor market, the employment will
reduce. The increase of labor income share depends on two effects: the reduction of
employment (the substitution effect) and the rise of wage rate (the income effect).
The relationship between the two effects is determined by technology, which is meas-
ured by the elasticity of substitution (e). If e equals to 1, the two effects can be offset,
and any policy intervention has no effect on labor income share. If e is greater than
1, the effect of reducing employment will be greater, and the overall effect of MWR
on labor income share will be negative. Many neoclassical economists believe that e
equals to l or is greater than 1.
For the fact that labor income share has generally declined in European coun-
tries since the 1980s, neoclassical economists interpret the reason as biased techno-
logical progress. The biased technology progress theory (Acemoglu, 2002) deduces
e from the decrease of labor income share and then explains labor income share by
e. The production function is set to be the Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES), as shown in formula (1). i is for the industry. y, l and k are for output, labor
and capital. N and M are technology coefficients of two factors, and e is for the
elasticity of substitution. The prices of labor and capital are w and r, and the first-
order condition of profit maximization is formula (2). In formula (3), LS refers to
labor income share. The first equation represents the definition of LS with w as the
explaining variable, but the second equation replaces w by formula (2) with tech-
nical parameter (u) as the explaining variable. If biased technological progress
dominates in reality, u as the explaining variable is also reasonable and more
exogenous. However, there may exist biased technological progress in reality, but it
is difficult to identify, and u is always inferred through w. In fact, w may decrease
due to the decline of negotiation ability of labor union (Wei et al., 2013), then we
may mistake the decline of labor union’s negotiating ability as capital-biased
technological progress.
Yi ¼ 1 aið Þ NiLið Þ
ei1
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2.1.2. Theories supporting MWR
Supporters don’t believe the substitution effect can offset the income effect. Robinson
(1933) puts forward a monopoly model that if there is only one buyer in the labor
market, the enterprise’s marginal cost curve will be higher than its average one. Wage
rates and the numbers of workers determined by the intersections of the two cost
curves and the marginal revenue curve are set as (W0, L0) and (W1, L1), then
W0>W1, and L0< L1. Thanks to MWR, the marginal cost of hiring one more worker
will not be the wage rate of all workers. Therefore, if the mandatory minimum wage
is between W0 and W1, both the average wage rate and the employment will increase.
Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) also propose an ‘efficient wage’ model and believe the
minimum wage slightly above the equilibrium one will raise the cost of laying off.
Enterprises prefer to reduce monitoring costs and hire more workers instead. Ahn
et al. (2005) develop an endogenous search model, in which the minimum wage
raises employment by increasing the number of workers searching for jobs. Flinn
(2006) presents a matching model of the labor market, in which the minimum wage
enhances the bargaining power of workers and induces more of them to enter the
labor market, thus boosting the employment.
2.2. Theories of the relation between MWR and overwork
Will MWR lead to overwork? If so, even if it can increase labor income share by rais-
ing wage rate, we can hardly reach a conclusion on policy recommendations. Many
studies conclude that the income effect of MWR is greater and raising wage rate will
lead to overwork (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Golden & Altman, 2008). The marginal
theory believes that wage rate should equal the marginal output of labor and be
decided by existing production technology. Raising wage rate though MWR will force
the employer to prolong working time (Golden & Altman, 2008). Marx (1844) also
points out that with a given profit target, raising wage rate will extend working time.
Wang (2018) points out that hidden enforced overwork is widespread in China. Staffs
will prefer overwork when the proportion of basic salary is small or a working atmos-
phere is too competitive due to the knock-out system.
2.3. Empirical studies on the relation between MWR and labor income share
2.3.1. Empirical evidence of neoclassical economics not supporting MWR
Based on historical data, neoclassical economists establish the law that labor income
share can not be changed and deny the possibility of increasing it. Bowley (1920)
1732 Q. ZHAN ET AL.
discovers that labor income shares of British and the U.S. have been constant around
40% and 60% respectively from 1880 to 1913. This is named as the ‘Bowley’s Law’
(Samuelson, 1948). Later, Klein and Kosobud (1961) list the constancy of labor
income share as one of the ‘five great ratios’ in economics and set it as a constant
when framing a growth model. Kuznets (1955) find that labor income share is not a
constant, but first falls and then rises, which is called the ‘Kuznets Law’. According to
the former theoretical analysis and combining with the ‘Bowley’s law’ or the ‘Kuznets
Law’, e will equal to 1, which negates the possibility of MWR increasing labor
income share.
2.3.2. Empirical evidence against neoclassical economics’ conclusion
Blanchard et al. (1997) finds that labor income share has declined in European coun-
tries, such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain since the 1980s. The same conclusion
is generally confirmed by subsequent research (Hofman, 2001; Li et al., 2009).
Moreover, some empirical studies do not believe that raising wage rate will reduce
employment and support MWR (Katz & Krueger, 1992; Blazevic, 2013). The esti-
mates of e in China are generally less than 1 (Li & Li, 2018).
2.4. Empirical studies on the relation between MWR and overwork
It is generally believed MWR may lead to overwork in theory. Some empirical evi-
dence also supports this conclusion and believes MWR will increase working hours
(Yang & Li, 2016). But wage rate may reduce overwork. Dessing (2002) analyzes the
income and substitution effects of raising wage rate. He believes that raising wage
rate will let workers spend more leisure time in working, but also increase their
demand for leisure time due to more income. A higher wage rate will reduce over-
work as the income effect exceeds the substitution effect. Schor (2008) discovers that
working hours will be longer when the standard deviation of the Gini coefficient
increases. In other words, overwork is widely common with a greater income gap.
Wage rate has a significant positive influence on labor income share, thus a higher
wage rate will reduce overwork by narrowing the income gap. Mazzetti et al. (2014)
indicate that with the given spending expectation and revenue target, raising wage
rate can reduce overwork.
2.5. Literature summary
MWR can raise wage rate. However, on the issue of labor income share, mainstream
studies follow the neoclassical theoretical framework, regard wage rate as an endogen-
ous variable and substitute it with technical parameter u. They explain the decline of
labor income share as the result of biased technological progress, which theoretically
denies the possibility of MWR increasing labor income share. It is also controversial
both theoretically and empirically that MWR may cause overwork. The purpose of
our study is to verify whether MWR is a good solution by studying the influence of
raising wage rate on labor income share and overwork in China. We theoretically
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demonstrate the feasibility of wage rate as the explaining variable and analyze the
effectiveness of MWR through empirical tests.
3. Modelling and data explanation
3.1. The theoretical framework of the determinants of labor income share
Formula (3) is the theoretical framework of determining labor income share without
wage rate (w). Formula (4) is derived from formula (2). Formula (5) is obtained by
putting formula (4) into formula (3), which is our theoretical framework of determin-
ing labor income share including w and parameters (A, a, u and e). A, a and u are
entirely determined by technology, while e is influenced by both technology and
social factors.
Li ¼ 1 aið Þei  weii  1 uið Þ  Ai½ ei1  Yi (4)
LSi ¼ wiLiYi ¼ 1 aið Þ
ei  w1eii  1 uið Þ  Ai½ ei1 (5)
We can also get formula (6) from formula (2) and obtain formula (7) by putting
formula (6) into formula (3). e is shown in formula (8). e is constant in formula (1)
only if both technology and factor price are constant. In other words, once technol-
ogy or factor price changes, e will change too. Formula (8) implies that e is not
constant and determined by four factors: technology ((1-a)/a), technological progress
((1-u)/u), factor intensity (L/K) and relative price (r/w). Taking technology for
example, industries obviously use different technologies, and aggregate elasticities of
substitution between two regions are different due to different industrial structures;
different companies in the same industry may adopt different technologies; enter-
prises may adopt different technologies at different periods.























Formula (8) is only a simple deduction under a partial equilibrium model. In fact,
the complexity of the determinants of e has been systematically studied. Hicks (1963)
points out three different ways in which e can take place: as inter-sectoral substitution
of production, as intra-sectoral substitution of the known methods of production or
as substitution by innovations. Jones (1965) builds a formal general equilibrium
model and finds that aggregate elasticity is a weighted average of three elasticities
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under the two-sector hypothesis: the elasticity of substitution in the manufacturing
industry, the elasticity of substitution in the food industry and the elasticity of substi-
tution between the two industries. So, it is evident that factor reallocation, as well as
the application of new methods of production in one sector, are not only technically
determined, but are strongly influenced by the institutional framework (Klump & de
La Grandville, 2000). Klump also explains how trade unions affect e and believes that
it is the experience of trade unions that causes the Harrod-Domar Growth Model to
be based on the assumption of very limited substitution between capital and labor. In
conclusion, according to formula (8) and the existing literature, we believe that,
besides w, there are a number of factors influencing labor income share through e.
3.2. The empirical analysis of the determinants of labor income share
Many existing empirical studies (Wei et al., 2017; Wen & Lu, 2018) have used factors
influencing labor income share through e for research and our empirical model is
built on them for reference. Factors include industrial structure, bargaining power,
total factor productivity, enterprise size, market structure, export intensity, ownership
and the rate of change of wage rate. w has always been overlooked in former studies,
which is the difference and perhaps the contribution of our study. A regression model
is built as formula (9), in which w is the explaining variable, X are controlled varia-
bles, ui is the individual feature and eit is an error term.
lsit ¼ h0 þ h1  wit þ b  X þ ui þ eit (9)
Formula (9) does not take technology-biased progress as a controlled variable,
which is the most obvious difference from previous studies. Other controlled variables
are ascertained according to theory and empirical evidence of existing literature and
data availability. In order to achieve sound results, three samples are adopted: inter-
Table 1. Definition of variables and statistical description of sample 1: inter-provincial data of
all industries.
Variable Variable Name Formula Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Labor income share ls LI/GDP 771 0.492 0.074 0.314 0.816
Wage rate w ASUE 771 1.759 2.255 0.051 13.499
The proportion of the first industry gdp1r AVFI/GDP 771 0.149 0.083 0.004 0.460
The proportion of the second industry gdp2r AVSI/GDP 771 0.442 0.083 0.171 0.594
GDP per capita gdppc GDPPC 771 2.362 2.341 0.123 12.899
Indirect tax tr NPT/GDP 771 0.141 0.032 0.003 0.266
The proportion of foreign capital fcr RCFE/GDP 770 3.875 4.951 0.077 57.387
Foreign trade dependency ftdpd TIE/GDP 771 0.386 0.450 0.000 2.327
Sex ratio sr SR 465 104.099 3.774 92.250 120.430
Dependency ratio dpdr TDR 465 37.348 6.763 19.300 57.600
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.
Notes: 1. LI-labor income (100 million yuan per year); GDP-gross domestic product (100 million yuan per year);
ASUE-average salary of urban employees (10 thousand yuan per year); AVFI-added value of the first industry (100
million yuan per year); AVSI-added value of the second industry (100 million yuan per year); GDPPC-GDP Per capita
(10 thousand yuan per year); NPT-net production tax (100 million yuan per year); RCFE-registered capital of foreign
enterprises (million dollars per year); TIE-total import and export (10 million dollars per year); SR-sex ratio (the
female population ¼ 100); TDR-total dependency ratio (Population ¼ 100).
2. The principle of data processing is to make the numeric value of each variable as close as possible through the
unit adjustment, and the coefficient results after regressions would be relatively close. Some uncommon units of
measurement are used, such as 100 million, 10 thousand and million yuan, et al.
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provincial data of all industries (sample 1, described in Table 1), inter-provincial data
of industry only (sample 2, described in Table 2) and China’s industrial enterprise
data (sample 3, described in Table 3). The former two samples are from the website
of the National Bureau of Statistics, and the last comes from China’s Industrial
Enterprise Database. Data sources limit the selection of controlled variables to
some extent.
Industrial structure must be taken into consideration in sample 1. There is a nat-
ural difference in factor intensity between industries. If the proportion of the
labor-intensive industry is greater, labor income share will increase. Back in 1954,
Levinson (1954) distinguishes the different effects of inter-industry and intra-
industry on changes in labor income share, and later Solow (1958) puts forward a
formal definition of this phenomenon. Fan and Zang (2012) explain the change of
labor income share in China from the perspective of industrial structure develop-
ment. Therefore, we introduce the variable of industrial structure in sample 1,
including the proportions of the first (gdp1r) and second (gdp2r) industries. But
they are not included in samples 2 and 3. GDP per capita (gdppc), sex ratio (sr)
and dependency ratio (dpdr) will affect the supply of labor, which then affects L/
K. They are included both in sample 1 and 2, but not in sample 3 due to the lack
of data. While capital-labor ratio (kl), monopoly pricing power(markup) and
financial constraints (loanrate) are related to capital price and applied in sample
3, but not in sample 1 and 2 due to the lack of data. Sample 1 includes data from
31 provinces in mainland China. The data of former eight variables are from 1993
to 2017 and the latter two are from 2002 to 2017 with data in 2010 missing. The
data of sample 2 are from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics from
2006 to 2017.
Sample 3 covers 12 years from 1998 to 2013 with labor income share data between
2008 and 2010 missing. The number of enterprises varies from year to year, and the
Table 2. Definition of variables and statistical description of sample 2: inter-provincial data of
industry only.
Variable Variable Name Formula Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Labor income share ls LI/VAI 372 0.108 0.045 0.043 0.268
Wage rate w ASUEI 372 4.431 1.789 1.485 11.170
Indirect tax tr VATI/VAI 279 0.117 0.021 0.073 0.173
The proportion of foreign capital fcr FCI/PICI 341 0.095 0.089 0.002 0.401
The proportion of state-owned capital stater SCI/PICI 341 0.257 0.133 0.036 0.739
Export dependency exdpd EX/TOI 341 0.293 0.347 0.000 1.499
Capital-labor ratio kl FA/EN 279 67.259 33.774 18.857 248.761
Sex ratio sr SR 341 104.315 3.831 94.650 120.430
Dependency ratio dpdr TDR 341 36.321 6.460 19.300 55.100
Source: China Statistical Yearbook.
Notes: 1. China statistical yearbook includes three sub-sectors of industry, which are ‘mining’, ‘manufacturing’ and
‘electric power, steam and water industry’.
2. LI-total labor income of industry (100 million yuan per year); VAI-added value of industry (100 million yuan per
year); ASUEI-the weighted average wage rate of industry. Wage rate is the average wage of urban employees (10
thousand yuan per year), and the weight is labor income share from each sub-sector; VATI-value added tax of indus-
try (100 million yuan per year); FCI-foreign capital of industry (100 million yuan per year); PICI-paid-in capital of
industry (100 million yuan per year); SCI-state owned capital of industry (100 million yuan per year); EX-export vol-
ume (100 million yuan per year); TOI-total output of industry (100 million yuan per year); FA-fixed assets (100 million
yuan per year); EN-the employment of mining, manufacturing and electric power, steam and water industry together
(10 thousand persons); SR-sex ratio (the female population ¼ 100); TDR-total dependency ratio (the population
¼ 100).
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total of records are 3,032,559. But outliers and repeated ones must be deleted.
Specifically, there are two types of outliers: extremes and records beyond theoret-
ical scopes. We delete records belonging to one thousandth of the maximums and
minimums of 10 variables. The theoretical range of labor income share (ls), the
proportion of foreign capital (fcr), the proportion of capital from Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan (hmtr), the proportion of state-owned capital (stater), as well
as export dependency (exdpd) should be between 0 and 1. Records would be con-
sidered as outliers beyond this range. The other kind of records should be deleted
are repeated ones. Theoretically, enterprises with the same code should only have
one record in a year, but there are more. Basically, repeated records are deleted as
follows: (a) If sales revenue of two enterprises is the same, one must be deleted.
(b) If the name or legal representative of an enterprise is different in adjacent two
years, one should be deleted. (c) Records with the data of capital stock, the
employment, indirect tax and labor income share greater than twice or smaller
than half of which in adjacent years, should be deleted. (d) After the above three
steps, there are still 20 repeated records to be deleted. Finally, 2,792,111 useful
records are left.
As can be seen in Tables 1–3, labor income share is the biggest in sample 1
and the smallest in sample 2, which demonstrates that industrial structure has a
significant influence on labor income share. Meanwhile, compared with other
countries, each industry in China has a low labor income share (Zhan & Zeng,
2017). Internal factors account for 70% of the results, and it is essential to study
labor income share in an industry (Hu, 2016). The significant difference between
the three samples also indicates the necessity of cross-reference among samples.
In addition, if the same conclusions are achieved, they will have bet-
ter robustness.
Table 3. Definition of variables and statistical description of sample 3: industrial enterprise data.
Variable Variable Name Formula Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Labor income share ls TW/VAI 2435670 0.316 0.226 0 1
Wage rate w TW/EN 2733774 19.554 56.122 0 2034
Production tax tr TAX/VAI 2435670 0.183 0.170 3.067 4.715
The proportion of
foreign capital





hmtr CHMT/PIC 2371745 0.075 0.246 0 1
The proportion of state-
owned capital
stater SC/PIC 2374717 0.110 0.300 0 1
Export dependency exdpd EX/VAI 2170793 0.143 0.307 0 1.300
Capital-labor ratio kl FA/EN 2724113 126.662 429.402 0 11254
Monopoly pricing power markup RCMB/CMB 2750613 0.160 0.130 0.875 0.975
Financing constraints Loanrate IE/LIA 2654771 0.041 0.155 0.100 4.51
Source: China’s Industrial Enterprise Database.
Notes: TW-total wage (million yuan per year); VAI-added value of industry (million yuan per year); EN-the number of
employees (thousand persons); TAX-’taxes and extra charges of main business’ þ VAT þ ‘taxes in management
expenses’ (million yuan per year); FC-foreign capital (million yuan per year); PIC-paid-in capital (million yuan per
year); CHMT-capital from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (million yuan per year); SC-state owned capital (million
yuan per year); EX-export volume (million yuan per year); FA-fixed assets (million yuan per year); EN-the number of
employees (thousand persons); RCMB-revenue and cost of main business (million yuan per year); CMB-cost of main
business (million yuan per year); IE-interest expenditure (million yuan per year); LIA-liability (million yuan per year).
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4. Regression results analysis and robust tests
All three samples are panel data. After the uni-variate fixed effect regression analysis,
multi-variate fixed and random effect regressions are carried out for each sample. As
is seen in Table 4, the results of fixed and random effect regressions come to be
highly consistent, and the Hausman test is not applied. The results of robust tests are
recorded in Table 5. As Wei et al. (2017) point out that both sex ratio and depend-
ency ratio are important variables to influence labor income share, and the empirical
results are affirmative, we add sex ratio and dependency ratio in regression 1. But
owing to different data, the regression results are not significant. Besides, sex ratio
and dependency ratio in sample 1 have fewer data from the year 2002 to 2017, with
2010 missing. Because of the two reasons, regression 4 is conducted after deleting
them and the results are still robust.
Given the large capacity of sample 3, although a lot of extremes have been deleted
in the preprocessing stage, there is still a strong degree of dispersion. In order to alle-
viate the impact of heteroscedasticity, regression 5 is made after taking the logarithm,
and the results are as follows in Table 5. There are only 687 records left in regression
5 because of the loss of data during the logarithm process. Firstly, one of the three
variables, including the proportion of foreign capital, the proportion of capital from
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, as well as the proportion of state-owned capital, or
even all of them can be zero, and in this case, lots of data disappear. Secondly, enter-
prise export can be zero too. Finally, Wen and Lu (2018) delete all negative results of
the three variables, including production tax, monopoly pricing power and financial
constraints. But they are preserved in our study. VAT would be negative when input
tax is greater than output tax, and monopoly pricing ability would be negative when
the cost of main business is greater than the corresponding income. Financial con-
straints would be negative if interest revenue exceeds expense. Finally, there are much
fewer data left, but the regression results are still robust.
Regression 6 is for a sub-sample of sample 3 selected by year. After removing the
three vacant years from 2008 to 2010, we try to evenly disperse the selection and
choose three sets of data with an interval of six years. The results are robust. In fact,
the regression result is robust for any given year, but it is not listed due to lim-
ited space.
The findings show that raising wage rate has a significantly positive influence on
labor income share. But as long as the two are highly correlated, a significant regres-
sion result would be drawn regardless of which one is the explaining variable.
Therefore, it is necessary to verify the possibility of reverse causality. But we believe
reverse causality is highly impossible. As for the decision-making of enterprise own-
ers, wage rate is defined at the beginning of the year before the actual operation, and
labor income share is the result after one-year’s operation. In this case, wage rate is
more likely to determine labor income share in time sequence. Also, enterprise own-
ers would find it is difficult to determine wage rate according to the prediction of
labor income share at the beginning of the year. A wage rate lower than the market
price will lead to difficulties in recruiting employees. Moreover, as is mentioned
above, various factors can determine wage rate, including directly related (MWR) or
indirect ones, for instance, land policies and highly exogenous variables outside the
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economic system (such as household registration and labor unions). However,
exogenous variables that do not determine labor income share through wage rate are
relatively rare.
Regarding the regression results of controlled variables, first of all, capital intensity
has a significant negative influence on labor income share. The coefficients of capital-
labor ratio, GDP per capita and the proportion of the second industry are all signifi-
cantly negative. Given the economic development stage of China, industrialization
and capital deepening are two main ways to promote the economy, and regions with
higher levels of the two can achieve higher GDP per capita. Therefore, all of the three
have significantly negative correlations with labor income share. Compared with the
second industry, the capital intensity of China’s agriculture is still relatively low, and
the influence of the first industry on labor income share is significantly positive.
Secondly, the employer’s revenue and labor income share are in conflict. The coeffi-
cients of monopoly pricing power and financial constraints used to estimate the
return of capital are significantly negative in six regressions. Moreover, the results of
tax and the proportion of foreign capital are different in samples. Roughly speaking,
the results are negative in macro samples and positive in micro ones. We cannot con-
clude proper explanations for such differences here.
5. The influence of raising wage rate on overwork
The level of employment cannot indicate working hours. MWR will be futile for
employees and even offset its positive effect if raising wage rate leads to longer work-
ing hours. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether raising wage rate results
in longer working hours.
We build a new model as formula (10) (ow represents overwork, w is wage rate
and X is controlled variables). According to the previous literature, overwork results
from complicated factors. Wang (2018) divides them into six categories, including
physical, psychological, economic, social, management and cultural aspects. With a
reference to the research of Mazzetti et al. (2014), we select variables as follows in
Table 6:
owit ¼ h0 þ h1  wit þ b  X þ ui þ eit (10)
Controlled variables are described as follows: (a) Gender (sex). Mazzetti et al.
(2014) point out that women are more likely responsible for housework while men
take charge of earning money, so male workers have a stronger motivation for over-
work. This is consistent with the theory of family labor supply, and other scholars
like Jacobs and Gerson (2004) also hold this viewpoint. (b) The employment rate
(empl). Employers will have greater bargaining power when there is a sufficient labor
supply, and employees will show a higher degree of compliance and tolerance (Wang,
2018). (c) Mandatory minimum wage (mwr). This variable also affects wage rate and
bargaining power as mentioned above. (d) The Gini coefficient (gini). Schor (2008)
points out that the income gap will aggravate overwork. (e) GDP per capita (gdppc).
Golden and Altman (2008) believe that overwork will be reduced when the economy
develops to a certain level. This is consistent with the discussion of Mazzetti et al.
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(2014) from the perspective of social responsibility. (f) Income groups (incgrp). Boeri
and Garibaldi (2009) indicate that overwork is reduced in countries belonging to
higher income groups, the mechanism of which is similar to GDP per capita. (g)
labor dependency ratio (depend). It refers to the ratio of the employed to the
unemployed. Golden (2009) asserts that depend has a significant influence on over-
work, which is also supported by Mazzetti et al. (2014). (h) Chinese culture (culture).
Wang (2018) states that Chinese employees, influenced by the tradition of Confucian
culture, have a stronger tendency to overwork. We use it as the dummy variable and
set to 1 for mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, North
Korea and Singapore. (i) Position. Mazzetti et al. (2014) also study the impact of pos-
ition on overwork. Position is also an important factor in China’s research on over-
work. Chen and Chen (2015) investigate overwork among university teachers. Zhang
and Zhang (2018) study the overwork of assembly-line workers in the manufacture
industry. Professional (prof) and machine operational (mach) positions are selected in
Table 6. The former requires higher technical skills, while the latter needs lower
work skills.
The data of sample 4 (described in Table 6) are mainly from the website of the
International Labor Organization. The Gini Coefficients are from the World
Income Inequality Database (WIID) covering almost all countries in the world.
The data of MWR include 71 countries. The time period is from the year of 2000
to 2018, but many countries do not cover the entire period. When working hours
(hourwk) is the explained variable, 48 countries are included. When overwork
ratio (hour48shr) is taken as the explained variable, there are 44 countries in total.
Because variables are already applicable, the main task of this part is to delete
outliers. (a) For GDP per-capita, some data of Brazil and Russia are extremely
high and even more than 100 times of those in adjacent years. Therefore, 21
records are deleted. (b) In terms of wage rate, it can be seen from the density
function that the dispersion degree of the highest data is huge, and 24 records are
deleted with 400,000 as the limit. (c) Mandatory minimum wage. Similar methods
are applied to delete 19 records above 3,000 dollars. (d) Labor dependency ratio.
Similar methods are applied to delete 4 records with labor dependency ratios
above 5.
Figure 1 is plotted according to weekly working hours by country and year. The
black thick line represents China, and countries with the highest and lowest data
are specially marked. At the top, the asterisk refers to Turkey, the hollow triangle
is Qatar, the hollow circle is Saudi Arabia, the hollow square is Mongolia, and the
hollow diamond is Pakistan. At the bottom, the solid square represents Australia,
the solid diamond is the Netherlands, the solid circle is the United States, and the
solid triangle is New Zealand. In the middle, the cross marked line represents
Croatia. As is seen in Figure 1, weekly working hours are quite high in China,
which is consistent with the widespread social concern caused by the 996 speech
and the results of China’s Population Census in 2010. According to the census,
weekly working hours are 50.25 in cities, 48.62 in urban areas and 49.68 in rural
areas respectively.1 Compared with economics having the highest and lowest data,
weekly working hours are fewer in developed countries.
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The findings show that raising wage rate will not necessarily result in overwork.
The analysis method is the same as section 3. After the uni-variate fixed effect regres-
sion, multi-variate fixed effect and random effect regressions are carried out. The
results are shown in Table 7 and no coefficient is significant. Therefore, the influence
of raising wage rate on overwork is insignificant and factors influencing overwork is
complicated.
Gender is an important factor for overwork. A higher proportion of male
workers results in more overwork, which is consistent with the conclusion of pre-
vious theoretical literature and indicates that the social responsibility theory has
evidence in reality. However, neither the coefficient of employment rate nor
mandatory minimum wage is significant, indicating that bargaining power has no
significant influence on overwork (hour48sh). Wang (2018) divides overwork into
two major categories: active and passive. It is obvious from the results that weak
bargaining power has no relation with active overwork, and passive overwork is
not dominant as neither the coefficient of employment rate nor mandatory min-
imum wage is significant. The Gini coefficient and GDP per capita are insignifi-
cant to weekly working hours but significant to overwork. According to the
social responsibility theory (Mazzetti et al., 2014), workers with the lowest and
highest income are prone to overwork. Income groups (incgrp) and Chinese cul-
ture or not are deleted in fixed effect regressions. Because incgrp is represented
by gdppc already. The insignificant influence of Chinese culture or not shows
that although overwork in Japan, Korea and China is common, the rule is not
suitable for other countries. Labor dependency ratio is significant to weekly
working hours but insignificant to overwork, which indicates that though a
higher labor dependency ratio will lead to longer working hours, the influence is
limited. Both the proportion of professional position and the proportion of oper-
ational position have significant influences on overwork, but the former is posi-
tive, and the latter is negative, which is inconsistent with previous literature
conclusions.
Figure 1. Weekly working hours among different countries.
Note: The data of other economies are generally in the middle area of Figure 1.2
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6. Conclusions and prospects
It is widely believed that MWR can raise wage rate. We use twenty-three regressions
to verify the influence of raising wage rate on labor income share and overwork.
Through nine regressions of three samples and supplemented by the robustness tests,
we confirm that raising wage rate has a significant positive influence on labor income
share. Based on the International Labor Organization Database, six regressions are
taken and the results demonstrate that raising wage rate has no significant influence
on overwork. It comes to four specific conclusions as bellow:
Firstly, we support MWR. According to the definition of the International Labor
Organization, the purpose of MWR is to improve workers’ welfare. Given that
income and working hours are two factors to influence workers’ welfare, our two
empirical studies indicate that raising wage rate has a significantly positive influence
on income, but is insignificant to overwork. So, MWR can improve workers’ welfare.
Secondly, according to the results of our calculating, overwork is serious in China
with the average working hours per week ranking among the top five of 82 countries
in the world. Factors that may significantly increase overwork are a higher proportion
of male workers, a larger income gap, a lower per-capita income and a higher labor
dependency ratio. Although professionals may be the high-incidence group of overwork
in China, the proportion is significantly negatively correlated with overwork worldwide.
Thirdly, we offer a counterexample that cannot be explained nor predicted by neo-
classical economics. There would be no significant positive relation between raising
wage rate and labor income share if the Chinese practice conforms to the prediction
of neoclassical economics. The results of our study are robust, which indicates that
raising wage rate has a significant positive effect on labor income share.
Finally, we find that China’s marketing reform may have been excessive rather
than insufficient in the labor market against the background that many countries
deny China as a market economy. The 18th national congress of the CPC announces
that ‘the market should play a decisive role in the allocation of resources’ and the
mainstream of China’s reform is market-oriented. From the social discussion on the
issue of 996, it can be seen that the division between market and non-market fields is
still controversial in China, and excess marketization may exist in other fields.
There may be two areas for further research. Dessing (2008) asserts that workers
with different income will act differently as wage rate rises. The existing literature has
already investigated the relationship between wage rate and labor supply or overwork,
but there are few studies about the different influence of raising wage rate on labor
income share of different groups. Moreover, wage rate is exogenous in our work and
a much more reasonable explanation is given for the changes of labor income share,
which can be regarded as a success of non-neoclassical theory in the labor market
and provides a possibility of non-neoclassical theory to succeed in other fields.
Notes
1. <Tabulation on the 2010 population census>, China Statistics Press, 2012 edition.
2. Other economies include Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
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Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova Republic, Montenegro,
Namibia, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Venezuela,
Bolivarian Republic and Vietnam.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This study was supported by the National Social Science Found of China (Grant
No. 17CJL035).
References
Acemoglu, D. (2002). Technical change, inequality, and the labor market. Journal of Economic
Literature, 40(1), 7–72. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.40.1.7
Ahn, T., Arcidiacono, P., & Wessels, W. (2005). Minimum wages and positive employment
effects in general equilibrium. Duke University.
Bai, P. W., & Yang, Z. C. (2019). Labor bargaining power and labor income share-analysis of
the impact after the financial crisis. Management of the World, (5), 78–91.
Baijiahao. (2019). https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1630689728783536517&wfr=spider&for=pc.
Blanchard, O. J., Nordhaus, W. D., & Phelps, E. S. (1997). The medium run. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 1997(2), 89–158. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534687
Blazevic, S. (2013). Is employment decreasing due to the minimum wage increase? Economic
Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja, 26(1), 69–100. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2013.
11517591
Boeri, T., & Garibaldi, P. (2009). Beyond eurosclerosis. Economic Policy, 24(59), 409–461.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2009.00225.x
Bowley, A. L. (1920). The change in the distribution of the national income, 1880–1913.
Clarendon Press.
Chen, R. S., & Chen, T. X. (2015). Research on the influence mechanism of overwork and job
satisfaction of university teachers-based on the mediating variable of job burnout. Higher
Education Review, (2), 116–127.
Clark, J. B. (1899). The distribution of wealth: a theory of wages, interest and profits.
Macmillan.
Dessing, M. (2002). labor supply, the family and poverty: the S-shaped labor supply curve.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 49(4), 433–458. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-
2681(02)00011-2
Dessing, M. (2008). The S-shaped labor supply schedule: evidence from industrialized coun-
tries. Journal of Economic Studies, 35(6), 444–485. https://doi.org/10.1108/
01443580810916505
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Smith, R. S. (2003). Modern labor economics: theory and public policy.
Pearson Education Company.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 1747
Fan, C. L., & Zang, J. (2012). Research on structural optimization in the steady improvement
of labor income share - based on the perspective of industry and sector. China Industrial
Economics, (1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.19581/j.cnki.ciejournal.2012.01.001
Flinn, C. J. (2006). Minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search, matching,
and endogenous contact rates. Econometrica, 74(4), 1013–1062. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1468-0262.2006.00693.x
Geurts, S. A., & Sonnentag, S. (2006). Recovery as an explanatory mechanism in the relation
between acute stress reactions and chronic health impairment. Scandinavian Journal of
Work, Environment & Health, 32(6), 482–492. https://doi.org/10.5271/sjweh.1053
Golden, L. (2009). Working to live or living to work? A brief history of long work time and
the contemporary sources of overwork. Journal of Business Ethics, 84(S2), 217–227. https://
doi.org/10.2307/40294786
Golden, L., & Altman, M. (2008). Why do people overwork? Over-supply of hours of Labor,
labor market forces and adaptive preferences. Social Science Electronic Publishing, (3), 62–83.
Hicks, J. R. (1963). The theory of wages. 2nd ed. Macmillan.
Hofman, A. (2001). Economic growth, factor shares and income distribution in Latin America
in the twentieth century. CEPAL, mimeo.
Hu, Q. Y. (2016). Division of labor among different industries and the aggregate share of labor
reward. Economic Research, (2), 82–96.
ifeng. (2016). http://tech.ifeng.com/a/20161211/44512414_0.shtml.
International Labor Organization. (2006). Minimum wage fixing convention, 1970. http://www.
ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C131.
Jacobs, J. A., & Gerson, K. (2004). The time divide: Work, family and gender inequality.
Harvard University Press.
Jones, R. W. (1965). The structure of simple general equilibrium models. Journal of Political
Economy, 73(6), 557–572. https://doi.org/10.1086/259084
Katz, L. F., & Krueger, A. B. (1992). The effect of the minimum wage on the fast food indus-
try. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(1), 6–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/
001979399204600102
Klein, L. R., & Kosobud, R. F. (1961). Some econometrics of growth: great ratios of economics.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75(2), 173–198. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884198
Klump, R., & de La Grandville, O. (2000). Economic growth and the elasticity of substitution:
two theorems and some suggestions. American Economic Review, 90(1), 282–291. https://
doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.282
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income equality. American Economic Review, (1),
1–28. https://doi.org/10.1086/257662
Levinson, H. M. (1954). Collective bargaining and income distribution. American Economic
Review, (5), 26–48. https://doi.org/10.2307/1818344
Li, X. P., & Li, X. K. (2018). Biased technological change and the total factor productivity
growth of China’s industry. Economic Research Journal, (10), 82–96.
Li, D. K., Liu, L. L., & Wang, H. L. (2009). The U curve of labor share in GDP during eco-
nomic development. Economic Research Journal, (1), 70–82.
Marx, K. (1844). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. International Publishers.
Mazzetti, G., Schaufeli, W. B., & Guglielmi, D. (2014). Are workaholics born or made?
Relations of workaholism with personal characteristics and overwork climate. International
Journal of Stress Management, 21(3), 227–254. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035700
Navarro, P., & Autry, G. (2011). Death by China: confronting the dragon – a global call to
action. Pearson Education.
Net, X. (2018). http://www.xinhuanet.com/finance/2018-10/12/c_1123547814.html.
People’s Daily Online. (2013). http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/363551/366797.
People’s Daily Online. (2018). http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1106/c1004-30383952.
html.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press.
1748 Q. ZHAN ET AL.
Rebitzer, J. B., & Taylor, L. J. (1995). The consequence of minimum wage laws: some new the-
oretical ideas. Journal of Public Economics, (2), 251–255. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-
2727(93)01411-3
Robinson, J. (1933). The economics of imperfect competition. Macmillan.
Samuelson, P. A. (1948). Economics: An introductory analysis. 1st ed. McGraw-Hill.
Schor, J. (2008). Sustainable consumption and work-time reduction. Journal of Industrial
Ecology, 9(1–2), 37–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/1088198054084581
Sen, A., Rybczynski, K., & Waal, C. V. D. (2011). Teen employment, poverty, and the min-
imum wage: evidence from Canada. Labour Economics, 18(1), 36–47. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.labeco.2010.06.003
Solow, R. M. (1958). A sceptical note on the constancy of relative shares. American Economic
Review, (4), 618–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1808271
Sparks, K., Cooper, C., Fried, Y., & Shirom, A. (1997). The effects of hours of work on health:
a meta-analytic review. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 70(4),
391–408. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8325.1997.tb00656.x
Wang, X. (2018). A study on the definition of ‘overwork’ and its classifications. Journal of
China Institute of Labor Relations, 32(6), 53–59.
Wei, X. H., Dong, Z. Q., & Huang, J. L. (2013). Does labor Union improve labor share?
Theoretical analysis and evidence from private firms in China. Economic Research, (8),
16–28.
Wei, X. H., Dong, Z. Q., & Lan, J. J. (2017). Does regional gender imbalance affect the labor
share of income? Theoretical analysis and evidence from China. World Economy, (4),
129–146.
Wen, Y. B., & Lu, X. Q. (2018). The determination mechanism of changes in China’s labor
income share: based on the double perspectives of market competition and institutional
quality. Economic Research, (9), 83–98.
Yang, J., & Li, S. (2016). Will the increase of MWS improve rural migrants’ income? China
Economic Quarterly, 15(4), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.13821/j.cnki.ceq.2016.03.12
Zhan, Q. L., & Zeng, X. H. (2017). Is it a reasonable and effective way for cost reduction to
reduce the compensation of labor? Modern Finance and Economics, (12), 97–109.
Zhang, X., Yang, J., & Wang, S. (2011). China has reached the Lewis turning point. China
Economic Review, 22(4), 542–554. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2011.07.002
Zhang, C. W., & Zhang, S. B. (2011). A study on labor share in GDP in China. Labor
Economic Review, (1), 1–33.
Zhang, T. Q., & Zhang, Y. J. (2018). Research on the influencing factors of overwork of front-
line employees in China’s manufacturing industry. Labor Economics Review, 11(1), 101–111.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 1749
